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Freud on the Court: Re-interpreting
Sexting & Child Pornography Laws
Matthew H. Birkhold
Although many developments in child pornography law are
troubling, perhaps the most disconcerting is the growing number
of cases in which children are being charged with violating child
pornography laws for engaging in “sexting,” or sending sexually
explicit photographs via cellular phones or over the Internet.
Although the law implicitly considers children the victims of child
pornography and the photographer and audience as punishable
perpetrators, this logic is challenged by sexting cases. Yet in many
instances, children who take and send “lascivious” pictures of
themselves have been charged with violating the very law designed
to protect them from the harms associated with child pornography.
As a result, many scholars have recently decried the law as unjust
and questioned its confusing motives.
Existing scholarship has roundly criticized the situation’s
ostensible absurdity, but little work has been done to understand
the legal motives for charging juveniles in sexting cases. This
Article endeavors to better understand the motivation behind the
law’s perplexing stance on teenage sexting. A close analysis of
recent sexting cases reveals a remarkable correlation between
Freud’s theory of sexuality and sexting jurisprudence. Beginning
with the first Supreme Court decision on child pornography, New
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York v. Ferber, subsequent Supreme Court and District Court
decisions on child pornography and sexting have been based on a
strikingly Freudian logic. Perhaps fittingly, the alignment with
Freud is subconscious: no court has acknowledged that its
decision rests on a reading of Freud. Yet, as this article shows,
Freud offers an extraordinarily accurate theoretical account of
what judges have done in recent sexting cases.
Understanding sexting cases in light of Freud does more than
just explain the bewildering decisions of state and federal courts to
uphold convictions against children for violating child
pornography laws. In light of this unexpected finding, this article
also provides a new basis from which to assess the goals of the
law. As prosecutors continue to bring charges against teenagers
for sexting, this article offers judges an alternate model for
thinking about these difficult cases. Moreover, as more state
legislatures draft new rules governing teenage sexting—in 2012
thirteen states considered resolutions aimed at sexting—this article
proposes that lawmakers either abandon or correct their
subconscious Freudianism in sexting cases, offering suggestions
about how better to deal with teenagers who sext.
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INTRODUCTION
Child pornography law is a recent invention of the Supreme
Court, which first held in 1982 that states may prohibit the
depiction of minors engaged in sexual conduct.1 Since then, the
law of child pornography “has been left alone to occupy its own
peculiar and unpleasant realm,” spawning a disturbing body of
case law complicated by inconsistent state and federal regulations.2
Although many developments in child pornography law are
troubling, perhaps the most disconcerting is the growing number of
cases in which children are being charged with violating child
pornography statutes for engaging in “sexting.”3
These cases have engendered a two-part debate.4 One dispute
centers on the appropriate response “to adolescents who
voluntarily produce and disseminate sexually explicit images of
themselves.”5
The other discussion concentrates on the
constitutionality of prosecuting teens under existing child
pornography laws and the potential conflicts with First
Amendment jurisprudence.6
Nevertheless, the debate about
sexting has been largely ignored by legal scholars. To date, only a
few articles explicitly address sexting and the reach of child
pornography law.7
While each article makes different

1

See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982). In Ferber, the first Supreme
Court case to consider child pornography, the Court created an exception to the First
Amendment by unanimously holding that “child pornography” constituted speech
without constitutional protection. Id. at 753, 766. For an explanation of how Ferber
relates to sexting, see infra Part II, and for more comprehensive analysis of the case and
its significance, see Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921,
930 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, First Amendment] (explaining that the unanimous decision
of the court in Ferber is “extremely rare in First Amendment cases”).
2
Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 211
(2001) [hereinafter Adler, Child Pornography].
3
See Sarah Wastler, The Harm in “Sexting”?: Analyzing the Constitutionality of
Child Pornography Statutes that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, Possession, and
Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Images by Teenagers, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 687,
687–88 (2010).
4
See id. at 688.
5
Id. at 689.
6
See id. at 688–89.
7
See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Crime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context,
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 135, 168 (2010). Although much scholarship deals with child
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recommendations about how best to improve child pornography
laws to accommodate the growing practice of sexting, the
assumption about the law is generally the same: the law is flawed
and in need of improvement.8 With regard to juvenile prosecutions
for sexting, child pornography law has been variously described as
haphazard,9 out-dated,10 draconian,11 nonsensical,12 foolish,13
outrageous,14 and unjust.15
pornography, little attention has been explicitly devoted to youth sextingJulia Halloran
McLaughlin counted no more than eight articles in 2010. Id.
8
See, e.g., Mallory M. Briggs, “Send Me a Picture Baby, You Know I’d Never Leak
It”: The Role of Miller v. Mitchell in the Ongoing Debate Concerning the Prosecution of
Sexting, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 169, 192 (2012) (“Taking a picture of oneself to
disseminate may not fit into the actual meaning or intent of [child pornography
statutes].”); McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 174 (“Child pornography law is designed to
protect children from physiological, emotional, and mental health trauma associated with
the creation and distribution of the material. None of these policy objectives are achieved
by criminalizing non-obscene teen sexting conduct.”). Though, not everyone finds the
laws fully unreasonable. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography:
The Appropriate Societal Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 1, 45–48 (2007) (arguing that sexting teens should be required to register as
sex offenders); Megan Sherman, Sixteen, Sexting, and a Sex Offender: How Advances in
Cell Phone Technology Have Led to Teenage Sex Offenders, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
138, 156 (2011) (“Although teenagers should not be charged under the existing child
pornography statutes for sexting, it does not mean that states should completely
decriminalize the behavior.”).
9
Briggs, supra note 8, at 201 (arguing that “[p]rosecutors’ unfocused and haphazard
attempts to deal with the problem [of sexting] are partially due to technology’s everchanging face”).
10
See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 137 (contending that “[t]echnology has, once
again, outpaced the law”).
11
Antonio M. Haynes, The Age of Consent: When is Sexting No Longer “Speech
Integral to Criminal Conduct”?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 373 (2012) (discussing the
“increasingly draconian legislative responses” to child pornography in light of teenage
sexting).
12
Robert H. Wood, The Failure of Sexting Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Restraint, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 151, 177 (2009) (“[I]t is
nonsensical that teens may marry and have consensual sex at the age of sixteen in some
states, but a photographic image of their sexual exploits could send them to prison. It is
equally illogical that minors have the right to abortions and contraceptives, but the sexual
activity surrounding those rights is illicit. Our laws should be revised to accommodate
these realities.”).
13
Amanda M. Hiffa, OMG TXT PIX PLZ: The Phenomenon of Sexting and the
Constitutional Battle of Protecting Minors from their Own Devices, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV.
499, 530 (2011) (“Criminalizing sexting is as foolish as the behavior itself.”).
14
See Dr. JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional
Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 952 (2011) (“Most media reports have described
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Although scholarship has roundly criticized the situation’s
ostensible absurdity, little work has been done to understand the
legal motives for charging juveniles in sexting cases.16 Yet
meaningful solutions can be developed only by understanding the
underlying motivation of judges. This Article proposes doing just
that by turning to Sigmund Freud. Reinterpreting recent case law
in light of Freud’s theory of sexuality offers new insight into the
perplexing stance on sexting taken by judges, legislators, and
prosecutors across the country. This insight helps to explain the
legal actions many scholars consider unreasonable by uncovering
an ideological consistency undergirding the charges brought
against teenagers for violating child pornography laws.
Surprisingly, evaluating these cases from a Freudian
perspective reveals a remarkable correspondence between child
pornography jurisprudence and Freud’s diphasic understanding of
sexuality. Even if Freud never thought about sexting, it is clear
that the court, at least unconsciously, is thinking about Freud. This
insight offers an explanation for the much-maligned decisions of
state and federal courts to uphold convictions against children for
violating child pornography laws and also provides a new basis
from which to assess the goals of the law.
By analyzing leading U.S. District Court decisions on sexting,
as well as the first appellate court decision to address the problem,
Miller v. Mitchell,17 this Article examines trends in the ways in
which judges and prosecutors across jurisdictions deal with the
thorny issue of teenage sexting. To better understand the rationale
in these decisions, this study reinterprets New York v. Ferber,18 the
first Supreme Court case on child pornography, along with the

these situations with outrage, and that is understandable because the so-called victim of
child pornography is being treated as the perpetrator.”).
15
Sherman, supra note 8, at 156 (describing as “unjust” the prosecution and
punishment of teenagers who engage in sexting).
16
See id. at 159 (“The prosecution of teenagers represents a clear example of what can
happen when laws built on past cultural values are forced to address unanticipated social
phenomena.”); see also McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 154 (“In dissent, Justice Padovano
objected to the majority’s reliance upon § 827.071 to punish the minor defendant, since
the law was actually designed to protect this defendant.”).
17
598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).
18
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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2002 Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, striking down as overbroad two provisions of the 1996
Child Pornography Prevention Act,19 and the 1990 Supreme Court
decision in Osborne v. Ohio, allowing states to outlaw the
possession of child pornography.20 After discussing representative
cases, Part I of this article diagnoses as unreasonable the decisions
of many federal courts to charge teenagers with violating child
pornography statutes. Part II next describes Freud’s theory of
sexuality and Part III interprets the motives behind prominent
sexting decisions, expounding the striking similarities between
Freud’s anxiety about psychosexual development and the concern
of judges and prosecutors who charge children with violating child
pornography laws. In light of this unexpected finding, this Article
concludes by making recommendations about how judges and
legislators should best think about teenage sexting as it relates to
child pornography.
I. IS THE LAW UNREASONABLE?
Federal courts have routinely recognized the production and
dissemination of child pornography as a social problem, most
recently naming it “cancerous”21 and “one of the serious scourges

19

See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121.1(2),
110 Stat. 3009 (1996); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256–58 (2002)
(discussing the overbreadth of § 2256(8)(B) and § 2256(8)(D) of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996). The Act restricted child pornography on the Internet, covering
both pornography using real children as well as virtual child pornography. 18 U.S.C. §§
2251(1) & (5). Before the C.P.P.A was passed, Congress based restrictions on the
distribution of child pornography as set forth in New York v. Ferber. See Ashcroft, 535
U.S. at 241 (“Before 1996, Congress defined child pornography as the type of depictions
at issue in Ferber.”).
20
See 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
21
United States v. Campbell, 738 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (D. Neb. 2010). Although
Judge Kopf readily labels all child pornography “cancerous,” he cleverly distinguishes
the metastatic from the more benign forms of child pornography. In Campbell, the court
reasons that, though the material in question “does involve young girls between the
approximate ages of 13 and 15 behaving in a libidinous manner and lasciviously
exposing themselves,” the images are “also relatively tame from a qualitative point of
view.” Id. at 963. Whether we think the court should be involved in a “careful review of
the images,” as here, is a question for another time. Id. at 962; see also Adler, Child
Pornography, supra note 2, at 265.
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of our time.”22 In the Supreme Court’s estimation, child
pornography is especially reviled because it “harms and debases
the most defenseless of our citizens.”23 Children are thus the clear
victims of child pornography, while the photographer and
audience,
correspondingly,
are
considered
punishable
perpetrators.24
This reasoning, however, is challenged by the increasingly
widespread practice of “sexting,”25 a portmanteau of “sex” and
“texting” describing the transmission of sexually explicit
photographs via cellular phones or over the Internet.26 Under
federal law, child pornography includes any visual depiction that
involves or appears to involve a minor engaging in “sexually
explicit conduct.”27 Prohibited depictions of sexual conduct
encompass both explicit sex acts as well as “lascivious
exhibitions,”28 which has been broadly interpreted by the Court to
include images that do not even depict nudity.29 To be considered
22

Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 729 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008).
24
See Sherman, supra note 8, at 143–44 (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia
have child pornography statutes that make it illegal to possess, produce, and/or distribute
child pornography.”).
25
See Tamar Lewin, Rethinking Sex Offender Laws for Youth Texting, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/us/21sexting
.html?_r=0 (“One recent survey found that about one in five teenagers reported having
engaged in sexting.”).
26
Although sexting can also describe strictly verbal messages, for the purposes of this
article “sexting” is limited to the transmission of sexually explicit images. See Clay
Calvert, Kara Carnley Murrhee & Jackie Marie Steve, Playing Legislative Catch-Up in
2010 with a Growing, High-Tech Phenomenon: Evolving Statutory Approaches for
Addressing Teen Sexting, 11 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 51 (2010).
27
18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2006). “‘Sexually explicit conduct’ means actual or
simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii)
masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id.
28
Id. For a brilliant reading of the ways in which law has influenced how we look at
child pornography, see Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2.
29
See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (concerning, in part,
children wearing only swimsuit bottoms); United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 737 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“All of the children wore bikini bathing suits, leotards, underwear, or other
abbreviated attire while they were being filmed.”). In Knox, the defendant possessed
videos, in which the genital areas of clothed girls were closely zoomed. Id. at 737.
Although the Supreme Court remanded the case, the Third Circuit maintained its holding
23
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child pornography, images must instead meet some or all of six
factors that constitute a “lascivious exhibition,” for instance,
whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or if the setting
is sexually suggestive.30 As a result, nearly “everything becomes
child pornography in the eyes of the law,”31 from children on the
beach32 to children dancing and gymnasts dressed in leotards.33
that child pornography does not require the depicted child to be nude. See Adler, Child
Pornography, supra note 2, at 240. For more about the Knox case and its aftermath, see
id. at 239–40, 260.
30
United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). As Adler explains,
“[t]he leading case on the meaning of ‘lascivious exhibition’ is United States v. Dost, a
California district court case that announced a six-part test for analyzing pictures,” known
today as the “Dost Test.” Adler, First Amendment, supra note 2, at 953. According to
Dost,
[i]n determining whether a visual depiction of a minor constitutes a
‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area’ under §
2255(2)(E), the trier of fact should look to the following factors,
among any others that may be relevant in the particular case: 1)
whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s
genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction
is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated
with sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural
pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4)
whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the
visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in
sexual activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. Of course, a visual
depiction need not involve all of these factors to be a ‘lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.’ The determination will have
to be made based on the overall content of the visual depiction,
taking into account the age of the minor.
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832. The six factors, however, are not meant to be exhaustive. See
Adler, First Amendment, supra note 1, at 953 n.144. In addition to documenting
jurisdictions that have adopted the Dost test, Adler argues that the Dost test “has
produced a profoundly incoherent body of case law” Id. at 953.
31
Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 264 (“Child pornography law constitutes
children as a category that is inextricable from sex. The process by which we root out
child pornography is part of the reason that we can never fully eliminate it; the circularity
of the solution exacerbates the circularity of the problem. Child pornography law has a
self-generating quality. As everything becomes child pornography in the eyes of the
law—clothed children, coy children, children in settings where children are found—
perhaps everything really does become pornographic.”).
32
In United States v. Horn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
employed the Dost test to find that the images in question constituted child pornography.
187 F.3d at 789. The court explained that “[i]n the beach scenes, the girls are wearing
swimsuit bottoms, but a reasonable jury could conclude that the exhibition of the pubic
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Under these standards, the term “child pornography” is
beleaguered by both vagueness and overbreadth, as even the most
innocent family images could fall within the over-inclusive
definition.34 Consequently, when a minor takes and sends a
lascivious picture of his- or herself, the sexted image easily
amounts to “self-produced child pornography.”35 As a result, the
child can effortlessly be charged with violating child pornography
laws36—and, depending on the jurisdiction, the recipient can be
charged with possessing child pornography.37 In these cases, the
child is simultaneously considered the victim and the perpetrator.38
As a result, in sexting cases, prosecutors and judges must decide
whether the victim should be punished.39 In many instances, these
legal actors have decided to punish juvenile sexters for violating
child pornography laws, prompting widespread confusion over the

area was lascivious despite this minimal clothing because of the way in which the
pictures are framed,” noting that “[t]he ‘lascivious exhibition’ is not the work of the
child, whose innocence is not in question, but of the producer or editor of the video. In
this case, the producer or editor generated a product that meets the statutory definition of
sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 790.
33
See Knox, 32 F.3d at 737 (“All of the children wore bikini bathing suits, leotards,
underwear, or other abbreviated attire while they were being filmed. . . . In some
sequences, the child subjects were dancing or gyrating in a fashion not natural for their
age.”). For further context and explanation of the videos, see also Adler, Child
Pornography, supra note 2, at 260.
34
See Adler, First Amendment, supra note 1, at 941 (The law “presents obvious
problems of vagueness and overbreadth.”).
35
Leary, supra note 8, at 4, 4 n.8 (describing “minors who produce images of
themselves in sexually explicit poses or engaged in sexual conduct and display or
distribute them to others” as practicing a form of “self-exploitation”).
36
See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing
child pornography charges brought against a sixteen-year-old girl and her seventeen-yearold boyfriend for taking photographs of them engaged in sexual behavior).
37
See id. at 235 n.1 (noting that the boyfriend was also charged with one count of
possession of child pornography). Because the definition of child pornography varies
from state to state, there are several ways to charge teens with violating child
pornography statutes for engaging in sexting. See Melissa Wells et al., Defining Child
Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in Investigations of Internet Child
Pornography Possession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 270 (2007).
38
See Leary, supra note 8, at 5–6 (discussing the societal dilemma in balancing the
punishment necessary to combat child pornography with the possibility that “selfexploitation is an act by a minor perhaps not fully mature enough to recognize the harms
caused”).
39
See id. at 48.
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law’s motives and protest about the resulting “miscarriage of
justice.”40
Recent arrests in Pennsylvania, Florida, and New Jersey typify
the cases fueling the debate about whether children are being
unfairly charged with violating child pornography statutes for
sexting.41 Although there is currently no universal legislative
response to sexting as it relates to child pornography, the cases
discussed below are representative of the behavior considered
punishable, as well as indicative of the common motivation for
punishing the very victims the law intends to protect.42
The Third Circuit became the first federal appellate court to
address sexting and the reach of child pornography law in Miller v.
Mitchell.43
In 2008, school officials at Pennsylvania’s
Tukahannock High School discovered nude and semi-nude images
of teenage girls on students’ confiscated cell phones.44 In one
image, two girls were wearing opaque bras and another photograph
showed a third girl wearing a towel around her torso with her
breasts exposed.45 In the judgment of the district attorney, these
images constituted child pornography.46
Consequently, he
40

Sherman, supra note 8, at 159.
See Lewin, supra note 25. Child pornography charges for sexting can take many
forms. The examples given here are representative of the variety of acts that can be
considered self-produced child pornography. Depending on the jurisdiction, charges can
be brought against the teenager-sexter as the disseminator of child pornography as well as
the recipient as the possessor of child pornography. In part, it depends on how the six (or
more) factors of the Dost test are interpreted by the court. See United States v. Dost, 636
F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986). However the Dost test compels the court to take a
disturbingly close examination of such images. For a disturbing example of how the
Dost-test compels the court to closely examine such images, see United States v. Wolf,
890 F.2d 241, 244–45 (10th Cir. 1989).
42
See generally Catherine Arcabascio, Sexting and Teenagers: OMG R U Going 2
Jail???, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2010) (noting that, depending on the state, a variety of
factors are relevant to charging children with violating child pornography laws,
including: the age of the actors depicted; the age of the recipients; whether the image was
created and sent with consent of the depicted child; the intent of the children involved;
the extent of further dissemination beyond the first recipient).
43
See Wastler, supra note 3, at 689.
44
See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing plaintiffs’
complaint, the evidentiary hearing, and the District Court’s opinion).
45
See id. at 144.
46
See id. at 142 (“In 2008, the District Attorney of Wyoming County in Pennsylvania
presented teens suspected of ‘sexting’ with a choice: either attend an education program
41
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threatened to prosecute the girls depicted (and the teens whose
phones contained the digital pictures) for distributing and
possessing child pornography, a felony charge, unless the teens
successfully completed a program focused on education and
counseling.47 Ultimately, the case was dropped,48 but other
juvenile-sexters have not been as lucky.49
In 2009, one year before the Miller decision, a fourteen-yearold New Jersey girl posted thirty “racy pictures” of herself on the
Internet for the sake of her boyfriend.50 Initially, the student faced
up to seventeen years in prison and life-long registration as a sex
Eventually, the Passaic County
offender, if convicted.51
Prosecutor’s Office dropped the child pornography charges, but
only on the condition of the girl’s successful completion of six
months of counseling.52
In other cases, teenage sexters are actually convicted.53 In A.H
v. State, for instance, a Florida appellate court upheld the
conviction of a sixteen-year-old girl for violating state child

designed by the District Attorney in conjunction with two other agencies or face felony
child pornography charges.”).
47
See id. at 143. To avoid prosecution, most of the students involved agreed to
participate in the five-week education program. See Wastler, supra note 3, at 689–90.
Three students and their parents, however, filed suit Civil Rights Act section 1983
complaint against Skumanick, alleging that the threat of prosecution for not participating
in the educational program violated their First Amendment rights to free expression and
freedom from compelled expression. Id. The parents additionally alleged violation of
their Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct their children’s upbringing. Id.; see Verified
Complaint paras. 59, 64–66 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009)
(No. 09CV00540).
48
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (In the end, the
court found a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail and granted a
temporary restraining order prohibiting the district attorney from filing criminal charges
against the plaintiffs for producing the sexted images in question.).
49
See Lewin, supra note 25.
50
See Sherman, supra note 8, at 145; see also Lewin, supra note 25. (While it is
unclear whether the “sexually explicit” photographs might be considered child
pornography of the metastatic or benign variety, I have, for obvious reasons, not tried to
locate the images.).
51
See Sherman, supra note 8, at 145.
52
See N.J. Teen Won’t Face Child Porn Charges for Posting Nude Photos of Self on
MySpace, FOX NEWS (June 23, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 0,2933,528602,00.
html.
53
See Lewin, supra note 25.
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pornography statutes after she sexted her seventeen-year-old
boyfriend in 2007.54 A.H. and her boyfriend had engaged in
consensual sexual conduct and A.H. took several pictures of the
act.55 For subsequently sending the pictures to her boyfriend, A.H.
was charged with violating state child pornography laws.56
Notably, neither teen sent the images to a third party, but because
of her age, A.H. was charged with producing, directing, and
promoting child pornography.57
Instinctually, it might seem outrageous to charge the teenagers
in these cases for violating child pornography laws; after all, they
do not seem like the perpetrators the law originally intended to
punish.58 Likewise, the possibility that consenting sexual partners
may be required to register as sex offenders for sharing nude
photographs with each other may also rightfully seem outrageous.
Most scholarship on sexting and the law has registered this
outrage.59
Applied to sexting cases, child pornography laws are described
as “a blunt instrument, which has created unintended
consequences,”60 and an “ill fit” for the act of sexting.61 These
cases raise a number of critical questions concerning the
constitutionality of prosecuting minors who produce and
disseminate “self-produced sexually explicit images” and the best
way to respond to children who engage in sexting, if these can
even be considered child pornography cases.62 Most of the
criticism about sexting cases, though, comes from doubts about the
harm against which child pornography laws are trying to protect.

54

949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 235.
56
Id. (“The State alleged that, while the photos were never shown to a third party,
A.H. and J.G.W. emailed the photos to another computer from A.H.’s home.”).
57
Id. (“A.H. and J.G.W. were each charged with one count of producing, directing or
promoting a photograph or representation that they knew to include the sexual conduct of
a child, in violation of section 827.071(3), Florida Statutes.”).
58
See Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 39.
59
See Leary, supra note 8, at 45–48.
60
Joanna L. Barry, The Child as Victim and Perpetrator: Laws Punishing Juvenile
“Sexting”, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 140 (2010).
61
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 171.
62
Wastler, supra note 3, at 691.
55
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Existing scholarship mostly considers the harm in sexting as
mismatched with the harm of child pornography.63 Broadly, there
are two positions on juvenile sexting as child pornography.64
Compared with “true child pornography,”65 sexting is seen as a
“less sinister activity”66 that does not reach the same level of
exploitation or potential abuse.67 In this view, when sexted images
are not coerced, the immediate “psychological, physical, and
emotional harm” to a child “that is the foundation of the child
protection rationale is decidedly absent.”68 The scholars in this
position believe that the law is intended to protect against child
abuse stemming from the production of child pornography in
particular.69 So, even if there is eventual harm from the circulation
of the image or later embarrassment, sexting itself does not cause
the sort of harm against which the law protects because it was done
63
See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 137 (arguing that “[o]ur existing law is indeed a
blunt instrument because it fails to distinguish between teen sexting images and true child
pornography”); Wastler, supra note 3, at 698 (arguing that “[a]n adolescent taking nude
or scantily clad photos of themselves or recording their consensual encounters does not
suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and emotional harm of the kind suffered by
child sexual abuse victims”). See generally Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 33 (arguing
that using child pornography statutes to punish sexting teens “goes beyond the
contemplated purpose and intent of those laws”).
64
See Wastler, supra note 3, at 687–88.
65
Hiffa, supra note 13, at 515.
66
Barry, supra note 60, at 140.
67
See Hiffa, supra note 13, at 515.
68
Wastler, supra note 3, at 698.
69
See, e.g., Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 242 (arguing that among the
five reasons cited for the exclusion of child pornography from constitutional protection,
the main thrust of Ferber is that “[c]hild pornography must be prohibited because of the
harm done to children in its production.”); Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 34 (“The
purpose of child pornography statutes is to shield children from the abuse that occurs in
the production of the photo.”). In Arcabascio’s estimation, the “critical issues always has
been ‘whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of
the work.’” Id. at para. 36 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982)).
Pointing to the decision in Free Speech Coalition, Arcabascio concludes that “a charge of
child pornography requires a proximate link to a crime, i.e. the child abuse in the
production of the pornographic image,” noting that where “no crime occurs in the taking
of the picture, the distribution argument cannot stand alone and must fail.” Id. at para. 37.
This leads Arcabascio to conclude that, when done voluntarily and consensually, “the
exchange of nude photography [by minors] should not be considered exploitation or child
abuse,” and that the children involved “should not be treated as a disseminator of child
pornography and . . . should not be prosecuted as a possessor of child pornography.” Id.
at para. 39.
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consensually, ostensibly avoiding any abuse related to the
production of the child pornography or sexted images.70
Alternatively, others scholars argue that there is no harm from
sexting at all.71 If no harm is perceived, prosecuting teen sexters
under child pornography laws logically seems unreasonable.72 If
child pornography laws are intended to “protect children from the
physiological, emotional, and mental health trauma associated with
the creation and distribution of the material,”73 the argument goes
that innocuous sexting should not be prosecuted as child

70

Whereas some scholars fail to find any harm from voluntary, consensual sexting,
even when done by minors, others consider the possibility that all pornography may be
harmful if viewed by a child, not because of abuse or the inducement of bad conduct, but
as moral harm. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1654 (2005) (suggesting that adults, too, are subject to harms
stemming from obscene pornographic material as well).
71
See, e.g., Wastler, supra note 3, at 698 (“Sexting should be considered outside the
scope of the child pornography exclusion because such images, like virtual child
pornography, do not involve the sexual abuse of a child,” explaining that a teenager who
sexts “does not suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and emotional harm of the
kind suffered by child sexual abuse victims.”); Walster argues that “[s]exting should be
considered outside the scope of the child pornography exclusion because such images,
like virtual child pornography, do not involve the sexual abuse of a child,” explaining that
a teenager who sexts “does not suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and
emotional harm of the kind suffered by child sexual abuse victims.” Id. at 698. See, e.g.,
Sherman, supra note 8, at 145 (explaining that in the case with the New Jersey girl,
“technically no harm or exploitation of a minor occurred”); Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell
Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children Become Child
Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1,
27 (2009) (“For instance, if a fourteen year-old girl snaps a picture of herself posing
naked and lying on her own bed while alone in her own bedroom, she likely is not
suffering either physical abuse or emotional abuse when the image is being captured.”).
By describing the fourteen year-old girl as “likely” not suffering abuse and the New
Jersey girl as “technically” unharmed, these scholars deny the harm stemming from
sexting while concurrently opening up the possibility of such harm to exist. Instead of
leaving the “technical” and the “possible” unexplored, the next part of this article, infra,
analyzes the connection between self-produced child pornography and psychosexual
harm by turning to Freud.
72
See Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When
Children Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 46 (2009) (“For instance, if a fourteen-year-old-girl snaps a
picture of herself posing naked and lying on her own bed while alone in her own
bedroom, she likely is not suffering either physical abuse or emotional abuse when the
image is being captured.”).
73
McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 174.
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pornography.74 Recognizing that juveniles are the “vulnerable
class” that the laws were meant to protect from sexual abuse,75
many detect a “profound and troubling irony” when minors are
prosecuted for violating child pornography statutes for sexting.76
Some even believe that punishing juvenile sexters with violating
child pornography laws could “ultimately cause a lifetime of
harm” worse than any harm derived from the sexting itself.77
Mismatched from the harm of sexting, child pornography law is
thus widely considered unreasonable when applied to cases like
those in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Florida.
The very idea of self-produced child pornography rightly raises
a number of questions about exactly what harm stems from child
pornography. How are judges rationalizing their decisions to
punish the victims the law intends to protect? Reinterpreting
sexting cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s 1905 Three Essays on
the Theory of Sexuality offers a surprising explanation for the
motivation to charge juvenile victims as perpetrators of selfproduced child pornography: many judges fear that juvenile
sexting will jeopardize the development of a normal sexual life for
the children involved—including both those who send and those
who receive sexted images—and, as a result, compromise society
as a whole.78 This is precisely Freud’s concern.
II. FREUD’S THEORY OF SEXUALITY
A. Psychosexual Development
Freud envisioned psychosexual development as a narrow
course besieged by perversion-inducing perils: “[e]very step on
this long path of development can become a point of fixation . . .

74

See id. at 179 (arguing that the law never intended to encompass sexting because it
only intended to prohibit activities resulting in harm).
75
Barry, supra note 60, at 133 (“Juveniles were not the intended targets of these laws;
rather, they were the vulnerable class that legislators intended to protect.”).
76
Calvert, supra note 71, at 60.
77
Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 33.
78
See Koppelman, supra note 70, at 1653–54.
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can be an occasion for a dissociation of the sexual instinct . . . .”79
Numerous factors, from an excess of parental affection to
premature exposure to sexual objects, affect the path’s successful
navigation where even minimal straying could result in grave
danger.80 For in the end, the “play of influences which govern the
evolution of infantile sexuality” result in its “outcome in
perversion, neurosis or normal sexual life.”81 Recently, judges and
prosecutors across jurisdictions appear to be trying to control a
new influence on the path of children’s’ psychosexual
development: sexting.
According to Freud’s theory, a child’s psychosexual
development is diphasic, divided by a period of latency.82 The first
phase encompasses the oral, anal, and phallic stages in which an
infant pursues and satisfies his or her libido.83 In the phallic stage,
children finally become aware of their own and others’ bodies.84
By undressing themselves, investigating their genitals, and
similarly exploring each other, children gratify their curiosity,
learning the sexual differences between male and female.85 Freud
notes that “children are essentially without shame” and “show an

79

SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY 101 (James Strachey
ed. & trans., Basic Books 2000) (1905) [hereinafter THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF
SEXUALITY].
80
See id. at 89, 94. Parental affection, and in particular maternal affection, is
described by Freud as a sexual act: the mother “regards [the child] with feelings that are
derived from her own sexual life: she strokes him, kisses him, rocks him and quite clearly
treats him as a substitute for a complete sexual object.” Id. at 89. This act, however,
instructs the child how to love, ensuring that the child “grow up into a strong and capable
person with vigorous sexual needs and to accomplish during his life all the things that
human beings are urged to do by their instincts.” Id. Like seduction, however, timing and
degree are important factors. Freud explains that “an excess of parental affection does
harm by causing precocious sexual maturity and also because, by spoiling the child, it
makes him incapable in later life of temporarily doing without love or of being content
with a smaller amount of it.” Id.
81
Id. at 38.
82
See id. at 42.
83
See id. at 49–55.
84
See id. at 58 (“Small children whose attention has once been drawn—as a rule by
masturbation—to their own genitals usually . . . develop a lively interest in the genitals of
their playmates.”).
85
See id. For more on the castration complex and penis envy, see id. at 61.
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unmistakable satisfaction in exposing their bodies, with especial
emphasis on the sexual parts.”86
Between the first phase of childhood sexuality and the onset of
the second phase with adolescence, sexual development enters a
period of relative stability.87 In this period, sexual feelings are
dormant and no new organization of sexuality develops.88 Freud
names this the “latency period” and describes its main feature as
the deferment of the reproductive functions.89 The latency period
thus represents a pause in the development of sexuality.90
Nevertheless, the period is characterized by much activity.91
Sexual instinctual forces are still present, but are diverted and
directed into other areas, making this stage crucial not just to the
child’s future sexuality, but also to society as a whole.92 Many
important developments occur in the latency period due to the
diversion of sexual energy, including the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex,93 the construction of mental dams,94 and, most
importantly, the formation of the super-ego.95

86

Id. at 58.
See id. at 42–44.
88
See id. at 43.
89
See id. at 44.
90
See id. According to Freud, this process “deserves the name ‘sublimation.’” Id. (“It
is possible further to form some idea of the mechanism of this process of sublimation.
One the one hand, it would seem, the sexual impulses cannot be utilized during these
years of childhood, since the reproductive functions have been deferred—a fact which
constitutes the main feature of the period of latency.”) Id.
91
See id. (“Thus the activity of those impulses does not cease even during this period
of latency, though their energy is diverted, wholly or in great part, from their sexual use
and directed to other ends.”).
92
See id. (“Historians of civilization appear to be at one in assuming that powerful
components are acquired for every kind of cultural achievement by this diversion of
sexual instinctual forces from sexual aims and their direction to new ones . . . .”).
93
See SIGMUND FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, in 19 THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 173, 173 (James
Strachey ed. & trans. 1961) [hereinafter The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex]
(“[Oedipal] dissolution takes place; it succumbs to repression . . . and is followed by the
latency period.”).
94
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 178 (discussing
the building up of mental dams, namely, disgust, shame, and morality, during the latency
period).
95
See SIGMUND FREUD, The Ego and the Id, in 19 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 12, 34 (James Strachey ed. &
87
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The start of the latency period marks the dissolution of the
Oedipus complex, causing the child to realize that his or her desire
for the parent of the opposite sex cannot be fulfilled.96
Consequently, during “the period of latency children learn to feel
for other people who help them in their helplessness and satisfy
their needs a love which is on the model of . . . their relation as
sucklings to their nursing mother.”97 Turning away from the
oedipal wish and searching for love,98 the child begins to identify
with the parent of the same sex,99 finally transferring the libido
interest from parents to friends100 and activities.101 Children thus
devote the energy previously put into the oedipal problem into
developing themselves, including tempering their primitive drives
with what Freud names “mental forces.”102
These forces include “disgust, feelings of shame and the claims
of aesthetic and moral ideals.”103 According to Freud’s model,
mental forces are “built up” during latency “which are later to
impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like dams, restrict its
flow.”104 Because these forces restrain the instinct “within the
limits that are regarded as normal,” Freud considers the struggle of
the sexual instinct against the mental dams a necessary component
of developing a healthy sexual life.105 If the mental dams fail to
trans. 1961) [hereinafter The Ego and the Id] (“[T]he ego ideal [or super-ego] had the
task of repressing the Oedipus complex.”).
96
See The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, supra note 93, at 173.
97
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 88–89.
98
See id. at 88.
99
See The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, supra note 93, at 175–76.
100
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 91, 95, 98.
101
See id. at 44.
102
See id. at 43–44 (“It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built
up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like
dams, restrict its flow—disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral
ideals. One gets an impression from civilized children that the construction of these
dams is a product of education, and no doubt education has much to do with it. But in
reality this development is organically determined and fixed by heredity, and it can
occasionally occur without any help at all from education. Education will not be
trespassing beyond its appropriate domain if it limits itself to following the lines which
have already been laid down organically and to impressing them somewhat more clearly
and deeply.”).
103
Id. at 43.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 28.
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adequately provide resistances, little will keep the sexual drives on
the narrow path to normalcy.106 As an example, Freud explains
that “the force which opposes scopophilia [the love of looking] . . .
is shame.”107 By feeling shame for what they are doing when they
look at others, children are able to overpower the perverse force of
scopophilia and remain securely on the path to healthy sexuality.108
In this way, learned feelings in the form of mental dams act as a
powerful weapon against perversions and thereby “protect”
children from unhealthy sexual deviancy.109
Despite their importance, these perversion-prophylactics are
developed only in latency.110 For Freud it is therefore essential
that the latency period lasts long enough for all of the necessary
dams to be constructed and for psychosexual tasks to be
accomplished before the sex drive can safely function.111 “[B]y
the postponing of sexual maturation,” Freud explains, “time has
been gained in which the child can erect . . . restraints on
sexuality . . . .”112 Notably, during this period, children also “take
up into [themselves] the moral precepts” that are made by
society.113
Accordingly, a principal task of the latency period is the
construction of the super-ego.114 In The Ego and the Id, Freud
describes the super-ego as the outcome of “two highly important
factors,” one of which is the “interruption of libidinal development

106

See id.
Id. at 23.
108
See id. at 23, 28.
109
See id. at 17 (“Those who condemn [use of the mouth as a sexual organ] . . . as
being [a] perversion[], are giving way to an unmistakable feeling of disgust, which
protects them from accepting sexual aims of the kind.”).
110
See id. at 43–44 (“It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built
up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like
dams, restrict its flow—disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral
ideals.”); see also id. at 28 (“Our study of the perversions has shown us that the sexual
instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of
which shame and disgust are the most prominent.”).
111
See id. at 91.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 35.
107
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by the latency period.”115 During this time, the super-ego is
differentiated from the ego.116 The super-ego, comprising the
organized part of the personality structure, criticizes and prohibits
one’s drives, feelings, fantasies, and actions.117 Described as “the
representative . . . of every moral restriction,” and “the
advocate . . . striving towards perfection,” the super-ego is “the
higher side of human life.”118 Under this theory, civilizing
constructions emerge at the cost of the infantile sexual impulses:
“[h]istorians of civilization appear to be at one in assuming that
powerful components are acquired for every kind of cultural
achievement by this diversion of sexual instinctual forces from
sexual aims and their direction to new ones.”119 In short, the
latency period “appears to be one of the necessary conditions of
the aptitude of men for developing a higher civilization . . . .”120
The stakes of the latency period are consequently high. For the
individual, what is learned or not learned “is of the highest
importance in regard to disturbances of [the] final outcome” of
sexual life.121 And, on a larger cultural level, maintaining the
latency period is essential to society as a whole.122
B. Seduction and the Harm of Sexual Precocity
In addition to constructing mental dams and forming the superego, staying on the path of normal sexual development during
latency also involves avoiding harmful biological and social
115

Id.
See id. at 34.
117
See id. (“[The super-ego] also comprises the prohibition: ‘You may not be like this
(like your father)—that is, you may not do all that he does; some things are his
prerogative.’”).
118
SIGMUND FREUD, Lecture XXXI: The Dissection of the Psychical Personality, in 22
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD
57, 67 (James Strachey ed. & trans. 1964); accord The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at
36 (“[W]e can say, ‘and here we have that higher nature, in this ego ideal or super-ego . .
. .’”).
119
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 44.
120
Id at 100.
121
Id. at 66.
122
See id. at 91. After the latency period, the second wave of sexuality sets in and
determines, based on the mental dams and super-ego developed in the latency period, if
the child “is to remain healthy, and the symptomatology of his neurosis, if he is to fall ill
after puberty.” Id. at 55.
116
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pitfalls to maintain the proper “play of influences”123 governing the
evolution of infantile sexuality.124 One such influence is “sexual
precocity,” which is “manifested in the interruption, abbreviation
or bringing to an end of the infantile period of latency.”125
Interrupting the latency period is “a cause of disturbances” because
it occasions “sexual manifestations which, owing on the one hand
to the sexual inhibitions being incomplete and on the other hand to
the genital system being undeveloped, are bound to be in the nature
of perversions.”126 Consequently, “sexual precocity makes more
difficult the later control of the sexual instinct by the higher mental
agencies.”127 The source of this harmful precocity, according to
Freud, is “first and foremost, seduction by other children or by
adults.”128
According to Freud, seduction can take two forms. The first
kind of seduction “treats a child as a sexual object prematurely,”129
before the requisite mental dams are in place to help restrain and
divert libidinal energy to society-building and self-building
tasks.130 Seduction can also take the form of presenting a child
“prematurely with a sexual object for which the infantile sexual
instinct at first shows no need.”131 In either case, seduction has the
same devastating effects on the child.132

123

Id. at 38.
See id. at 106–07.
125
Id. at 106.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 108. For more about seduction generally, see SIGMUND FREUD, Further
Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence, in 3 STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, 157, 168–69, 168 n.1 (James Strachey ed. &
trans. 1962) (explaining that Freud might have over-stated the prominence of seduction,
but still says that its harm is real).
129
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 56.
130
See id. at 57 (“[A]n aptitude for [sexual irregularities] is innately present in their
disposition. There is consequently little resistance towards carrying them out, since the
mental dams against sexual excesses—shame, disgust and morality—have either not yet
been constructed at all or are only in course of construction, according to the age of the
child.”).
131
Id.
132
See id. (“[U]nder the influence of seduction children can become polymorphously
perverse, and can be led into all possible kinds of sexual irregularities.”).
124
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Freud is explicit about the negative impacts and dangers of
seduction: “[e]xperience further showed that the external
influences of seduction are capable of provoking interruptions of
the latency period or even its cessation.”133 As a result, under the
influence of seduction, children “can be led into all possible kinds
of sexual irregularities.”134 This is in part because the dams
guarding against unhealthy sexual excesses—shame, disgust, and
morality—have not yet been constructed or are only in the process
of construction, depending on the age of the child.135 Moreover,
“any such premature sexual activity diminishes a child’s
educability.”136 Seduction, therefore, reinforces its harmfulness,
by both interrupting the important tasks of latency that inform a
child how to behave and by making education more difficult.
While it is possible for internal causes to spontaneously arouse
a child’s sexual life, Freud repeatedly notes that “an influence [like
seduction] may originate either from adults or from other
children.”137 Significantly, adults are not the only dangerous
actors; children can also seduce themselves and each other by
prematurely treating each other as sexual objects or by prematurely
presenting each other with sexual objects.138
Given the importance of the latency period, Freud holds sexual
precocity through seduction as invariably dangerous.139 By
interrupting latency, seduction results in the development of
perversions, and, if widespread, seduction could also compromise
higher civilization itself.140 To guarantee normal psychosexual
development, before children are exposed to sexual objects—or are
treated like sexual objects—it is therefore essential to postpone
sexual maturation long enough to ensure the complete construction
of mental dams and the super super-ego.141 Besides protecting
latency, this process can be additionally aided “with the assistance
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 100.
Id. at 57.
See id.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 56.
See id. at 57.
See id. at 106–107.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 57.
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of education.”142 Although Freud explains that this psychosexual
development is “organically determined and fixed by heredity,” he
admits that “education has much to do with . . . the construction of
these dams.”143 This is precisely what the court appears to be
doing in the contested sexting cases: extending the latency period,
postponing sexual maturation, and aiding in the construction of
dams, by prohibiting sexting as harmful seduction.
III. COURTS’ FREUDIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
DAMAGE OF SEXTING
A. Sexting as Seduction
Subjecting the law to a Freudian analysis reveals the parallel
between the anxiety of judges and prosecutors about sexting and
the harm of seduction. In many cases, judges characterize children
as inhabiting the latency period.144 Accordingly, any sexual
activity undertaken during this period is tantamount to sexual
precocity,145 which includes sexting. Many courts, in short, are
subconsciously trying to protect children from sexting as a form of
Freudian seduction.146
Many jurisdictions even think about children in the same terms
as Freud. Juvenile sexting is regularly described as a “lapse in
good judgment,” highlighting the belief that teenage sexters are
immature and not yet equipped to contend with sexual subjects.147
As the decision in A.H. v. State clarified, the “appellant was simply
too young to make an intelligent decision about engaging in sexual
conduct and memorializing it. Mere production of these videos or
pictures may also result in psychological trauma to the teenagers

142

Id. at 98.
Id. at 43–44.
144
See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
145
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 106.
146
Similarly, scholars have connected sexting with psychosexual development. See,
e.g., Barry, supra note 60, at 133 (“Sexting is the newest expression of teenagers’ urge to
examine their developing sexual identity . . . .”). But to date no legal study has connected
sexting with Freud’s theory to shed new light on the law’s motivation in charging
children with violating child pornography statutes.
147
See, e.g., Hiffa, supra note 13, at 530.
143
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involved.”148 Yet, the production of sexually explicit images may
also later prove embarrassing for adults, causing similar
psychological damage.149 But whereas the court is unconcerned
with the effects of sexting on adults, the relative youth of teenage
sexters renders the same consensual behavior especially
injurious.150 Note, also, that the explicit concern is not with
circulation, but with “[m]ere production.”151 The act itself, when
performed by a teenager, is somehow especially dangerous due to
the youth of the sexter.152
When discussing teenagers’ poor judgment and the delayed
onset of shame for sending lascivious pictures of themselves,
judges effectively treat juvenile-sexters as if they are still busy
navigating Freud’s dangerous path of sexual development. In
many sexting cases, the depicted child is later reported to feel
“great amounts of shame . . . because of their involvement in the
production” of the self-produced pornographic images.153 Notably,
shame is felt only after children who sext have willingly taken and
distributed lascivious pictures of themselves.154 More fully
developed feelings of shame, therefore, might have prevented the
sexting.

148

A.H., 949 So. 2d at 238–39.
See id. at 239.
150
See id.
151
Id.
152
See id.
153
Shannon Shafron-Perez, Average Teenager or Sex Offender? Solutions to the Legal
Dilemma Caused by Sexting, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 431, 448 (2009).
Shafron-Perez goes on to describe how teenagers who voluntarily self-produce sexually
explicit images of themselves are later “tortured by internal shame and regret” Id. at 449;
see also Leary, supra note 8, at 11 (“Regarding the perpetuity of the crime, Congress
noted that, ‘where children are used in its production, child pornography permanently
records the victim’s abuse, and [the images’] continued existence causes the child victims
. . . continuing harm by haunting those children in future years.’” (quoting Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121.1(2), 110 Stat. 3009
(1996))); Mimi Halper Silbert, The Effects on Juveniles of Being Used for Pornography
and Prostitution, in PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH ADVANCES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
215, 226 (Dolf Zillman & Jennings Bryant eds., 1989) (“The long-term impact of
participating in pornography appears to be even more debilitating than the immediate
effects.”).
154
See Shafron-Perez, supra note 153, at 449.
149
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Freud’s theory offers an explanation for this phenomenon: as
one of the mental dams governing sexuality, shame develops
during latency.155 Without this dam fully constructed, the juvenile
“satisfaction in exposing their bodies, with especial emphasis on
the sexual parts,” as Freud described it, may win out, especially if
the teenager who practices sexting is still in latency.156
Children’s motivation for sexting also indicates occupation of
the latency period between the two phases of sexual
development.157 Recent studies suggest that many teenagers
engage in sexting to satisfy their desire for love and acceptance,158
another feature of Freud’s latency period.159 After the dissolution
of the Oedipus complex, children seek out new forms of love.160
Normally, this takes the form of non-sexual activities, like
pursuing hobbies,161 unless children are seduced and prematurely
exposed to sexual objects.162 Described as love-seeking163 and
immature,164 juveniles who engage in sexting are routinely
characterized as if they are in a period of latency, when children
should be building mental dams and constructing super-egos, and
specifically when exposure to sexual subjects is particularly
harmful.165

155

See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 43.
Id. at 58.
157
See Barry, supra note 60, at 133 (“Teenagers have turned to ‘sexts’ as [a] new form
of expression of their urges to examine their developing sexual identity.”); see also
Dahlia Lithwick, Teens, Nude Photos and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 2009,
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/13/teens-nude-photos-and-the-law.html
(“[T]he
great majority of these kids . . . think they’re being brash and sexy.”); Wendy Koch,
Teens Caught ‘Sexting’ Face Porn Charges, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/2009-03-11-sexting_N.htm (explaining that kids
engaged in sexting often do not know that it is a crime). See generally THREE ESSAYS ON
THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 66.
158
See Jamie L. Williams, Teens, Sexts, & Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications
of Current Sexting & Cyberbullying Laws, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1017, 1027–28
(2012).
159
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 88.
160
See id. at 88, 95.
161
See id. at 44.
162
See id. at 44, 100.
163
See Williams, supra note 158, at 1028–29.
164
A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
165
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 178.
156
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Sexting, like seduction, also takes two forms. The child who
takes a lascivious picture of him- or herself is treated prematurely
as a sexual object.166 Correspondingly, the juvenile recipient of the
sexted image is presented prematurely with a sexual object.167
Analogous to Freud’s theory, children are punished for both
sending sexually explicit images of themselves and for possessing
sexually explicit images of other children.168 In A.H. v. State, for
example, the sixteen year-old defendant was punished for
producing and disseminating child pornography and the recipient
of the sexted images, her seventeen year-old boyfriend, was
charged with possession of child pornography.169
In addition to paralleling seduction by prematurely exposing
juveniles to sex, the harm from sexting also derives from the same
perpetrators as seduction in Freud’s theory. In sexting cases,
courts have recently recognized that children can harm other
children.170 In February 2011, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky noted in Clark v. Roccanova that
child pornography laws do not distinguish between adults and
children: “there is nothing in the legislative history which would
indicate Congress intended ‘person’ to mean an adult,” further
clarifying that “Congress refers only to ‘persons’ and does not
narrow the term to adults.”171
166

See Williams, supra note 158, at 1028.
See id.
168
Depending on the jurisdiction, different acts, including sending and receiving are
penalized differently. For example, a current bill under consideration in the Hawaiian
state senate makes it an “affirmative defense . . . [if] the person took reasonable steps to
destroy or eliminate the nude photograph or video of a minor.” S.B. 2222, 26th Leg.
(Haw. 2012).
169
See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235.
170
See United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 919 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing
preventative measures taken against the “use of pornographic depictions of children in
the seduction or coercion of other children into sexual activity”); see also Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).
One kind of harm stemming from children is obvious, as in the case of Jessica Logan. See
generally Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Ohio
2011) (discussing the harassment and subsequent suicide of Jessica Logan stemming
from a nude sext of her from the neck down).
171
772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011). The opinion goes on to explain that “the
legislative history of [18 U.S.C. § 2252] states that the ‘Committee on Human Resources
has a deep and abiding concern for the health and welfare of the children and the youth of
167
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In Clark v. Roccanova, the harm of children seducing each
other is readily apparent: here, a group of fourteen year-olds
successfully persuaded fourteen year-old Clark to self-produce a
sexually explicit video of herself.172 After the defendants
subsequently transmitted the video over the Internet, the persuasive
group of teenagers were charged with violating federal child
pornography laws.173 In 2010, a similar case occurred in
Wisconsin, where a nineteen year-old boy was convicted of two
counts of sexual abuse of a child after he used Facebook to
convince more than thirty of his male classmates to send him
naked pictures of themselves, whom he subsequently blackmailed
into performing sexual acts.174 In these cases, by treating other
children as sexual objects, teenagers caused considerable harm,
equivalent to Freud’s conception of seduction.
In the most extreme cases, the danger of children seducing
each other, in a Freudian sense, is even greater, and has even
resulted in the tragic suicides of the children depicted in the sexted
images. For instance, in Logan v. Sycamore County School Board
of Education, a teenage girl committed suicide after enduring
months of cyberbullying for sending a nude photograph of herself
to her former boyfriend, who subsequently distributed the
picture.175

America,’ and therefore ‘condemns such base and sordid activities which may
permanently traumatize and warp the minds of the children involved.’” Id. (quoting S.
REP. NO. 95-438, at 3 (1977)). The court concludes that “[e]ncounters which produce
child pornography ‘cannot help but have a deep psychological, humiliating impact on
these youngsters and jeopardize the possibility of healthy, affectionate relationships in the
future.’” Id.
172
See id. at 846–47.
173
See id. at 847.
174
See Laurel Walker, Stancl Gets 15 Years in Prison in Facebook Coercion Case,
MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.jsonline.com/
news/waukesha/85252392.html (explaining that the New Berlin High School student then
used the images to “blackmail at least seven boys, ages 15 to 17, into performing sex
acts”).
175
See Logan, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 595. After sending a nude photograph of herself to
her former boyfriend’s cell phone at his urging, Jessica Logan endured months of cyber
bullying as the picture was quickly distributed to cell phones in several area high schools
and eventually committed suicide. Id. For a closer examination of the case and its
relation to cyber bullying, see generally Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District
Liability for Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal
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But many courts are concerned with more than just the most
egregious cases. Across the country, judges are fearful of even
consensual and private sexual acts between children as they relate
to sexting.176 In A.H. v. State, for instance, the sexted image was
shared only between consenting sex partners.177 Nevertheless, the
lack of circulation proved inconsequential.178 Children, it seems,
can also hurt themselves, by exposing themselves and treating
themselves as sexual objects prematurely.179
Regardless of whether from an adult, another child, or the child
him- or herself, the harm is the same. In Clark v. Roccanova the

Standards Emerging in the Courts?, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227
(2011).
176
See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). Of course,
the Supreme Court has long recognized the government’s compelling interest in
protecting children from harm. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 640 (1968). And, as established in Ferber, this compelling interest has created a
remarkable exception in First Amendment jurisprudence to prevent the abuse of children
stemming from child pornography. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760–62
(1982); see also United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918–19 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
CPPA was designed by Congress to serve all of these interests . . . (1) to prevent the use
of virtual child pornography to stimulate the sexual appetites of pedophiles and child
sexual abusers; (2) to destroy the network and market for child pornography; (3) to
prevent the use of pornographic depictions of children in the seduction or coercion of
other children into sexual activity; (4) to solve the problem of prosecution in those cases
where the government cannot call as a witness or otherwise identify the child involved to
establish his/her age; (5) to prevent harm to actual children involved, where child
pornography serves as a lasting record of their abuse; and (6) to prevent harm to children
caused by the sexualization and eroticization of minors in child pornography.”).
177
See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235.
178
See id. at 238–39. The dissent held a different view:
[t]he critical point in this case is that the child intended to keep the
photographs private. She did not attempt to exploit anyone or to
embarrass anyone. I think her expectation of privacy in the
photographs was reasonable. Certainly, an argument could be made
that she was foolish to expect that, but the expectation of a sixteen
year old cannot be measured by the collective wisdom of appellate
judges who have no emotional connection to the event. Perhaps if the
child had as much time to reflect on these events, she would have
eventually concluded, as the majority did, that there were ways in
which these photos might have been unintentionally disclosed. That
does not make her expectation of privacy unreasonable.
Id. at 240–41 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
179
See id. at 237–38.
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court was explicit about this point, holding that “[n]othing in the
record indicates that a child would be less traumatized if that
pornography is created or transmitted by a child rather than an
adult.”180 Like the reasoning in Clark, noting that “[n]othing in the
jurisprudence indicates that such harm could be done only by adult
perpetrators,”181 the dicta in A.H. v. State reads like a passage out
of Freud, who attributes the harms of sexual precocity to
“seduction by other children or by adults.”182
Even the ways in which courts and state legislatures are
choosing to punish teenage sexting resemble Freud’s 1905 theory
of sexuality, further substantiating the notion that sexting is
injurious seduction. Both judicial and legislative responses to
sexting suggest that teenagers who engage in sexting need
additional sex education, indicating that the children involved have
more to learn before they are ready to be exposed to sexual objects
or are treated as sexual objects.183 In A.H. v State the trial court
found that “[p]rosecution [under child pornography statutes]
enables the State to prevent future illegal, exploitative acts by
supervising and providing any necessary counseling to the
child.”184
This objective was made even clearer in Miller v.
Skumanick.185 Here, the district attorney “promised that the
charges would be dropped if the child successfully completed a
six- to nine-month program focused on education and

180

772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (interpreting the legislative history of the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92
Stat. 7 (1978)).
181
Id.
182
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 108.
183
See, e.g., A.H., 949 So. 2d at 238–39 (stating that the “[a]ppellant was simply too
young to make an intelligent decision about engaging in sexual conduct and
memorializing it” and that even the production of the images can result in psychological
trauma for the children involved); see also Assemb. 1560, 214th Leg., 2010 Sess. (N.J.
2010) (proposing a law that would require school districts to annually disseminate
information, including a description of the practice and its legal, psychological, and
sociological implications, to students and parents or guardians on the dangers of
distributing sexually explicit images through electronic means).
184
A.H., 949 So. 2d at 236.
185
605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
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counseling.”186 The proposed course, called a “re-education
program” was “designed to teach the girls to ‘gain an
understanding of how their actions were wrong,’ [and] ‘gain an
understanding of what it means to be a girl in today’s society, both
advantages and disadvantages.’”187 The program even included
homework, including assignments about why sexting is
“wrong.”188 Although the teenagers won their case in Mitchell,189
successfully arguing that threatening prosecution to force students
into the education program violated their Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights,190 many states today have
developed similar counseling programs as the preferred
punishment for sexting.191 Currently, bills under consideration in
186

Id. at 638.
Id.
188
Id.
189
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). Whereas Miller v. Skumanick was
the case name in the District Court, Miller v. Mitchell was the name of the case when
heard by the Court of Appeals.
190
See id. at 150–51. The students and parents in Skumanick filed suit Civil Rights Act
section 1983 complaint against Skumanick, alleging that the threat of prosecution for not
participating in the educational program violated their First Amendment rights to free
expression and freedom from compelled expression. See Verified Complaint at para. 62–
65, Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (2009) (No. 09CV00540). The parents
additionally alleged violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct their
children’s upbringing. See id. at para. 66.
191
See, e.g., Assemb. B. 321, Cal. Leg., 2011–12 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (punishing teenage
sexting with counseling); H.B. 4483, 80th Leg., 2nd Sess. (W. Va. 2012) (aiming to
create an “educational diversion program”). In fact, in 2012, thirteen states considered
legislation aimed at sexting, many of the bills and resolutions aimed at creating
educational counseling programs, and four states—Hawaii, New York, Pennsylvania and
South Dakota—passed such bills. See 2012 Sexting Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE
STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sextingOF
legislation-2012.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). The legislative response, on the state
level, has had an upward trend. Each year, more states consider resolutions addressing
juvenile sexting. In 2009, twelve states considered legislation addressing sexting. See
2009 “Sexting” Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2009.aspx
(last
visited
November 16, 2012). The following year, no fewer than sixteen states considered bills
dealing with sexting. See 2010 Legislation Related to “Sexting”, http://www.ncsl.org/
issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2010.aspx (last visited November 16, 2012).
In 2011, twenty-one states introduced legislation addressing sexting. See 2011
Legislation Related to “Sexting”, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2011.aspx (last visited
November 16, 2012). For an overview of the variety of legislative responses, see Lewin,
187
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the New York, South Carolina, and Texas legislatures would create
educational programs for juveniles convicted of sexting.192
If legislatures and judges across the country believe that
children who engage in sexting need additional education, these
legal actors must correspondingly believe that juveniles are not
fully educated about sexuality; that they do not have the proper
maturity to deal with sexting and therefore cannot exercise good
judgment.193 In light of the uniformity of the response across legal
domains, the law seems to believe that teenagers could easily stray
from the narrow path of normal sexual development by sexting,
and, as Freud says, “be led into all possible kinds of sexual
irregularities.”194 This belief reinforces the notion that children are
not yet through latency, but have additional mental dams to
construct, such as shame.
The latest punishment for sexting may even be supported by
Freud. After all, Freud suggested postponing sexual maturation to

supra note 25 and Jan Hoffman, States Struggle With Minors’ Sexting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/ 27sextinglaw.html. For a description
of the various legislative responses, including education programs, see Elizabeth C.
Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers’ Exchange of SelfProduced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 573–82 (2010); Audra L. Price,
Digital Lovers: Keeping Romeo and Juliet Safe from Sexting and Out of the Courthourse,
20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355, 365–67 (2011); Jacob J. Szymialis, Sexting: A
Response to Prosecuting Those Growing up with a Growing Trend, 44 IND. L. REV. 301,
318–22 (2010).
192
See H. 3130, S.C. Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2012) (creating the offense of
sexting and levying a civil fine and providing for an education program for a person
convicted of committing the offense); Assemb. B. 8131, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (2011)
(directing the attorney general to establish a juvenile sexting and cyberbullying education
demonstration program); S.B. 407, Leg. Sess. 82(R) (Tex. 2011) (creating education
programs centered on the prevention of sexting).
193
The recent legislative reaction to sexting corroborates this belief. Many states
suggest some type of education program for teenagers who are discovered sending
sexually explicit images of themselves. See Szymialis, supra note 191, at 319–22.
Similarly, most existing legal scholarship on sexting proposes educational programs as a
better response to sexting than prosecuting minors for violating child pornography
statutes. See id.; Eraker, supra note 191, at 573. In this way, legal scholarship, too, seems
to reflexively follow Freudian thinking. Like the courts, these recommendations also
suggest that sexting by minors is somehow wrong and premature, further underscoring
the notion that sexting is tantamount to some sort of pernicious seduction. See Szymialis,
supra note 191, at 319–20; Eraker, supra note 191, at 573–82.
194
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 57.
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ensure the complete construction of mental dams.195 And Freud
hinted that this task that might be accomplished “with the
assistance of education.”196
Although Freud described
psychosexual development as an organic process, he explicitly
allowed for the possibility of educative support as a crucial aspect
of normal sexual development.197 By punishing sexting and
ordering counseling programs in an attempt to instill “proper”
sexual mores, courts implicitly classify teenagers as occupying the
latency period, and implicitly classify sexting as harmful
seduction.198
B. The Harm of Sexting as Seduction
The most surprising parallel between sexting cases and Freud’s
conception of seduction is the underlying anxiety about the
resulting harm. In both cases, the fear is not immediate abuse.
Freud never discussed the direct harm stemming from seduction.
Instead, Freud was worried about the long-term sexual
development of children.199 By interrupting the latency period,
seduction results in sexual perversion, compromises the
construction of the super-ego, and ultimately risks damaging
civilization itself.200 In sexting cases, judges also typically ignore
the possibility of immediate harm; after all, sexting is selfproduced child pornography, so there is little immediate abuse to
think of.
Focused primarily on immediate harm, scholars have thus
roundly criticized the decisions of state and federal judges to
punish children for violating child pornography statutes.201 But
195

See id. at 43.
Id. at 98.
197
See id. at 43–44.
198
See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the
appellant was too young to make appropriate decisions).
199
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 97–98.
200
See The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 35 (“[The super-ego] represents the most
important characteristics of the development both of the individual and of the species . . .
.”); THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 45.
201
See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 174 (suggesting punishing teenagers under
child pornography statutes is “unduly heavy”); Wastler, supra note 3, at 702
(“Addressing the problem of child pornography as a new and unique problem will avoid
constitutional difficulties, prevent the application of overly harsh penalties to juvenile
196
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across the United States, judges are worried about a different kind
of harm. In the estimation of many courts, the harm from sexting,
like seduction, is long term and initially unobservable.202 Just as
Freud detailed the lasting psychological damage done by
premature exposure to sexual objects, judges are worried about
long-term psychosexual damage related to sexting.203 This
concern has been widely ignored in scholarship on child
pornography and sexting.
A careful analysis of recent sexting decisions reveals that the
court is concerned with a broader notion of child abuse than just
that stemming from the production of images that constitute child
pornography.204 That is, the harm that child pornography laws are
intended to protect against includes more than just immediate
abuse.205 After briefly considering New York v. Ferber,206 the first
Supreme Court case to consider child pornography, this section
will analyze more recent decisions of the Supreme Court and
federal district courts. Considering these cases, it becomes clear
that the perceived harm of child pornography, especially selfproduced child pornography, transcends obvious physical and
emotional harm. When scholars criticize the law’s irony for
punishing those it intends to protect, therefore, they deny the law’s
recognition that children need protection from themselves and each
other. Beginning with New York v. Ferber, sexting decisions
across jurisdictions suggest that courts are concerned with harm to

misadventure, and avoid undermining the legitimacy of traditional child pornography
regulation.”).
202
See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 157 (criticizing three state cases for lacking
sufficient evidence of long-term harm from sexting).
203
See, e.g., id. at 150–58; see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2010)
(fearing how minors are susceptible to external influences); A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239
(“Mere production of these videos or pictures may also result in psychological trauma to
the teenagers involved.”).
204
See, e.g., Clark v. Roccanova, 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (being
involved with these images can “have a deep psychological, humiliating impact”)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 6 (1977)); A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (“Mere production of
these videos or pictures may also result in psychological trauma to the teenagers
involved.”).
205
See, e.g., A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (“[I]f these pictures are ultimately released, future
damage may be done to these minors’ careers or personal lives.”).
206
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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the long-term psychological well-being of the children involved in
self-produced child pornography and, consequently, with harm to
society as a whole.207 This harm is essentially Freudian.
In Ferber, the Supreme Court based its prohibition of child
pornography, in part, on the grounds that “the use of children as
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological,
emotional, and mental health of the child.”208 The motivating
harm, however, was not restricted to the immediate abuse of the
child involved.209 Citing a Senate report, the Court explained that
the use of children in pornography is harmful to the children’s
lasting psychosexual development because sexually exploited
children “are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships
in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to
become sexual abusers as adults.”210
The court also acknowledged in Ferber that the production and
circulation of a “permanent record”211 of the child’s participation
in the pornography “may haunt him in future years, long after the
original misdeed took place.”212
The concern over this
memorialization was reiterated in the court’s 1990 decision in
Osborne v. Ohio, which reasoned that “[t]he pornography’s
continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by
haunting the children in years to come,” by creating materials that
“permanently record the victim’s abuse.”213 The Supreme Court’s
consideration of the future harm of memorialization and
circulation, however, has caused many scholars to ignore the other
future, long-term harm recognized by the Ferber decision, namely,
the harm to the child’s ability to form future relationship and
normal sexual development.
The fear of compromising long-term psychosexual
development, however, is the primary justification undergirding
207

See, e.g., Clark, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 847; A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
209
See id. at 758 n.9.
210
Id.
211
Id. at 759.
212
Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of
Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)).
213
495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
208
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recent decisions to charge teenagers with violating child
pornography laws for sexting.214 Although Ferber was decided
thirty years ago, the rationale is still relied upon today. In Clark v.
Roccanova the judge straightforwardly held that sexting will
“permanently traumatize and warp the minds of the children
involved,” covering both the child depicted and the child
recipient.215 Here, as in A.H. v. State, something about the act of
sexting itself proves inherently traumatizing, especially for
children.216
Accordingly, anxiety about memorialization and circulation is
not the driving impetus when children are prosecuted for sexting,
even though there are many attendant harms when child
pornography is produced.217 In addition to the harm suffered by
the depicted child, other children are indirectly harmed when child
pornography is produced.218 Even self-produced and consensual
child pornography in the form of sexting might be diffusively
harmful.219 As the Supreme Court noted in Osborne v. Ohio,
“pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into
sexual activity.”220 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
214

See, e.g., Clark v. Roccanova, 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011); A.H. v.
State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
215
772 F. Supp. at 847 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 3–4 (1977)). The court reasoned
that “[e]ncounters which produce child pornography ‘cannot help but have a deep
psychological, humiliating impact on these youngsters and jeopardize the possibility of
healthy, affectionate relationships in the future.’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 6
(1977)).
216
See id.; see also A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239.
217
See Koppelman, supra note 70, at 1652–54. Although there is no one position on
what constitutes the harm from child pornography, there are many attendant harms. Id.
Interestingly, perception of these harms has shifted over time. Id. at 1652 (“Concern
about harm to minors has always been central to obscenity law, though the conception of
harm has shifted over time.”).
218
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982) (Where the harm extends to
“society as a whole,” children other than the victims are also affected.) (quoting S. REP.
NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977))); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990)
(“[P]edophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”).
219
See Sherman, supra note 8, at 150–51 (quoting Mary Graw Leary, The Right and
Wrong Responses to “Sexting”, DIOCESE OF MADISON (May 12, 2009),
http://www.madisondiocese.org/Portals/0/Agencies/Safe_Environment/Sexting.pdf).
220
495 U.S. at 111. See 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL
REPORT 649 (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1986) (The Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography stating “[c]hild pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing
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Supreme Court reasoned that virtual child pornography may “whet
the appetites” of pedophiles.221 It is possible that “sexting” would
create a similar effect. Under this reasoning, a sexually explicit
image of a child sent over a phone could produce drastic results if
it entered into wider circulation and fell into the hands of a less
innocent predator.
Nevertheless, concerns about memorialization and circulation
alone cannot justify punishing teenagers for engaging in sexting.
In the 2002 decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute that
prohibited images of child pornography involving exclusively
virtual images of children.222 In the Court’s judgment, “[v]irtual
child victims. A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to
pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children
having ‘fun’ participating in the activity.”); Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at
243–44 (“In Osborne, the Court introduced an entirely new rationale for banning child
pornography: Pedophiles may use it to seduce new victims or to convince children to
submit to sexual violation. Until Osborne, it was unheard of in modern First Amendment
law that speech could be banned because of the possibility that someone might use it for
nefarious purposes.”); see also Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §
2251(10)(B) & (11)(A) (1996) (recognizing that child pornography must be prevented
because it “inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers .
. . ;” and because it “encourag[es] a societal perception of children as sexual objects . . .
.”).
221
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 263 (2002). For an interesting
discussion on the appropriateness of the term “whet the appetites” used in the legal
debates about child pornography, see Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line
on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line With the Research Evidence, 31
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 773, 781 (2007) (criticizing psychological evidence of
the connection between viewing child pornography and consequent acts of child abuse).
222
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256. In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania analyzed the Ashcroft decision, clarifying that
[a]s the Court emphasized in its analysis, however, the solution of
banning virtual child pornography proved to be unconstitutional in
part because it was not directly targeted toward the protection of real
children from the harms that may occur in the production of that
pornography. Unlike the CPPA, however, §§ 2257 and 2257A do not
ban any form of speech based upon the harms that may flow from its
content . . . nor do they reduce protected expression to unprotected
expression; rather, they impose content-neutral regulations on the
production of certain expression in order to prevent the sexual
exploitation of children. Thus, this Court heeds the caution urged by
the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, but does not
find it implicated by these statutes.
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child pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse
of children . . . .”223 Although virtual child pornography could lead
to actual instances of abuse or “whet the appetites” of pedophiles,
the link to the harm is “contingent and indirect,” and therefore
cannot justify prohibiting its production.224 As a result, the
dangers stemming from the circulation of sexually explicit images
of children cannot be the primary concern of judges punishing
children for sexting.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Ashcroft underscores an
important aspect of the harm for which a court may permissibly
ban child pornography: it needs to injure an actual child, and the
harm must be directly related to the child pornography.225 While
many scholars believe this decision presages the end of sexting
cases, such interpretations ignore the broader notion of
psychological damage against which the court is protecting.226
Scholars who claim that child pornography laws are unreasonably
narrowly construe the harm stemming from child pornography
without considering the possibility that self-produced child
pornography may also cause harm.227 That the decision in Free
Speech Coalition has not prevented lower courts from prosecuting
juvenile sexters for violating child pornography laws is telling.
Although self-produced child pornography may seem harmless,
especially where production and dissemination are consensual and
private, a clear distinction has been made between sexting and
virtual child pornography. In A.H. v. State, after all, the court
found immaterial the fact that sexted messages were not shown to
a third party. The mere act itself constitutes a hitherto undiagnosed
harm to the self, best explained through this Freudian logic. As a
result, even private sexting is considered intrinsically harmful,
justifying the injunction that a videotape or picture showing

Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 729 F. Supp. 2d 691, 735 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
223
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250.
224
See id. at 250, 253.
225
See id. at 256.
226
See Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 242–43.
227
See Sherman, supra note 8, at 150–51.
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“sexual conduct by a child . . . is never produced.”228 Unlike
virtual child pornography, sexting causes harm to an actual child
that is contingent and direct, even if initially imperceptible.229
When children prematurely treat themselves as sexual objects and
prematurely expose other children to sexual subjects via sexting,
the harm is not immediate in the form of physical abuse, but is
long-term and psychological.230 As recognized by the court in
Ferber, children featured in pornography “are unable to develop
healthy affectionate relationships in later life [and] have sexual
dysfunctions . . . .”231 Later courts have since extended this
rationale to include self-produced child pornography as well.232
Diagnosing the attendant dangers of child pornography, the
Supreme Court in Ferber projected the harm far beyond that to the
individual child him- or herself.233 It projected that the widespread
impairment of children’s psychosexual development stemming
from child pornography, including an inability to form healthy
attachments later in life, would result in cataclysmic consequences
for society.234 This is an undeniable echo of Freud’s concern that
seduction, by disrupting latency, will impair children’s super-ego
construction which, in turn, will adversely affect all of higher
civilization.
Under this reasoning, sexting is no exception to child
pornography. Even if the resulting images are self-produced and
consensual, sexting still exploits children as sexual objects.
Sexting, consequently, constitutes a form of seduction, eliciting the
same harms, with the same dual effect on the individuals involved
and on larger society. Although many have overlooked the

228

A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the state
legislature has a compelling interest in preventing the production of pornographic images
and videos of children).
229
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250 (finding that “the causal link [between virtual child
pornography production and instances of actual child abuse] is contingent and indirect”).
230
See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239.
231
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982).
232
See Lewin, supra note 25.
233
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9.
234
See id. (“[T]he use of children as . . . subjects of pornographic materials is very
harmful to both the children and the society as a whole.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at
5 (1977)).
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pernicious psychological effects of sexting and have focused
instead on the lack of immediate abuse suffered by the child who
willingly sends a sexually explicit image of him- or herself,235
understanding sexting as Freudian seduction makes the harm
against which the court intends to protect easier to diagnose.
The fear about sexting is thus the same fear shared by Freud
over a century ago. The law’s effort to prolong the latency period
by requiring educational counseling amounts to a final effort to
build mental dams and to delay sexual maturation until children are
ready to encounter sexual objects. The law’s punishment of
teenagers who engage in sexting, therefore, may not be as
unreasonable as it first seems.
By punishing teenage sexters for self-producing child
pornography, the law is protecting the latency period from the
harms related to the seduction of sexting. As a result, the law is
not just promoting teenagers’ normal psychosexual development
and helping to construct teenage super-egos, it is also protecting
society as a whole, by punishing the very victims the law was
designed to protect.
CONCLUSION: DO WE WANT FREUD ON THE COURT?
Interpreting sexting cases in light of Freud’s theory of sexuality
offers an explanation for the confusing motives of courts that
punish children for violating children pornography laws. With
Freud in mind, the actions of many courts may begin to seem less
“unreasonable” and “unjust.” Of course, the surprising alignment
with Freud, whose theory by many accounts is outdated,236 might
also provide a justifiable impetus to reevaluate the goals of the law.
235
See Wastler, supra note 3, at 698 (arguing that “[s]exting should be considered
outside the scope of the child pornography exclusion because such images, like virtual
child pornography, do not involve the sexual abuse of a child,” and explaining that a
teenager who sexts “does not suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and
emotional harm of the kind suffered by child sexual abuse victims”).
236
See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Identifying Law’s Unconscious: Disciplinary and
Rhetorical Contexts, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1075, 1089 (1997) (stating that traditional
theorists have rejected Freud’s theories as outdated); David S. Caudill, Pierre Schlag’s
“The Problem of the Subject”: Law’s Need for an Analyst, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 717
(1993) (claiming that many disregard Freud as outdated).
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In sexting cases, judges could be taking too seriously Freud’s
conception of a narrow path to sexual development and the idea
that “a disposition to perversions is an original and universal
disposition of the human sexual instinct . . . .”237 Recent sexting
cases demonstrate courts’ robust efforts to ensure “that normal
sexual behaviour is developed . . . as a result of . . . psychical
inhibitions occurring in the course of maturation . . . [including]
shame, disgust, pity and the structures of morality and authority
erected by society.”238 But is this the conception of sexuality we
want courts to promote today? Do we really want to continue
interpreting child pornography laws to hew so closely to Freud’s
theory of sexuality?
Regardless of whether we agree with Freud, analyzing sexting
cases from a Freudian perspective also offers a new position from
which to criticize the law, providing an alternative response for
judges confronted with children charged with violating child
pornography laws. In his groundbreaking work on sexuality,
Freud sought to correct the “gross error” of the widely held belief
that “the sexual instinct is absent in children.”239 Some scholars
argue that courts are still committing this error by continuing to
ignore Freud’s revolutionary findings. The problem, they claim, is
that courts have denied children all sexuality, thereby explaining
the overwrought anxiety in child pornography cases. But the
problem is just the opposite: courts are too Freudian, and many
judges are simply getting Freud wrong.
Over the last century, Freud’s theories have become entrenched
in the intellectual landscape and become a mainstay of popular
knowledge independent of the academic debates about Freud and
his work. As part of this cultural milieu, legal decision makers
have been unavoidably, if unknowingly, been exposed to popular
237

THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 97.
Id.
239
SIGMUND FREUD, The Sexual Enlightenment of Children (An Open Letter to Dr. M.
Fürst), in 9 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF
SIGMUND FREUD 129, 133 (James Strachey ed. & trans. 1959) (“It is commonly believed
that the sexual instinct is absent in children and only begins to emerge in them at puberty
when the sexual organs mature. This is a gross error, equally serious in its effects both
on knowledge and on practice; and it is so easily corrected by observation that one
wonders how it could ever have been made.”).
238
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interpretations of Freudian thinking; after all, “[c]ourts are
influenced . . . by popular knowledge, and judges as part of an
educated elite are influenced by social science learning to the
extent it penetrates their elite culture.”240
As long as these cases continue to bear a resemblance to Freud
and the resulting decisions continue to be based on a Freudian
logic, judges should at least get Freud right. Moreover, as state
legislatures increasingly consider resolutions that address juvenile
sexting, ensuring a proper understanding of Freud is all the more
important. In 2012, thirteen states considered bills aimed at
sexting.241 As this number grows, it becomes increasingly urgent
that legal actors better understand the motivation underlying the
decision to prosecute teenagers for sexting. In light of Freud’s
theory, judges hearing sexting cases and legislators devising new
solutions might make three changes to current child pornography
laws as they relate to sexting.
First, although the motivations underlying sexting cases chart
nicely onto Freud’s theory, one crucial aspect of Freud’s diphasic
model of psychosexual development does not map onto recent
sexting jurisprudence: timing.242 According to Freud, the “second
wave [of sexual development] sets in with puberty.”243 Yet, most
sexting cases involve children who have already begun puberty.244
The students in Pennsylvania posing in their bras, the New Jersey
girl who posted pictures of herself online, and the consenting
sexual partners in Florida are all undeniably in adolescence and,

240
Richard Lempert, “Between Cup and Lip”: Social Science Influences on Law and
Policy, 10 LAW & POL’Y, 167, 188 (2008) (examining how social science research
influences legal decision makers).
241
See 2012 Sexting Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation2012.aspx.
242
See generally A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (A.H. was
sixteen and her boyfriend was seventeen, clearly well past their latency phase, when they
were charged with child pornography); THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY,
supra note 79, at 66 (the choice of a model object is diphasic in that it occurs in two
waves).
243
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 66.
244
See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 144–45 (discussing the biological development of
adolescent brains and thus tendency to engage in risky conduct, including sexting).
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therefore, out of the latency period.245 With this in mind, many
jurisdictions are not protecting latency, but are attempting to
prolong the period. While this may be for good reason, especially
if many juveniles who engage in sexting demonstrate a lapse in
sound judgment, it is fair to question the effects of treating
teenagers as if they are still in latency when they have moved onto
the final phase of sexual development.
Given this insight, judges hearing sexting cases might correct
their unconscious Freudianism and give credence to the timing of
Freud’s developmental schema. If adolescents are no longer in a
period of latency, courts cannot justify punishing teenager sexters
for violating child pornography laws by citing concerns about
future-relationship formation and long-term psychosexual harm.
Psychosexual development is complete after latency and no
additional dams can be constructed.246 For that reason, the law
should carve out an exception for adolescents who engage in
sexting by creating a “sphere of sexual privacy for older teens” that
would exempt them from being charged with violating child
pornography laws.247
By providing a theoretical account of sexting decisions, Freud
also offers a new basis from which to criticize or bolster the
decisions of judges who punish the victim the law intends to
protect. If juveniles who practice sexting have already moved
beyond latency, they have already fully formed their super-egos.248

245

See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the
Pennsylvania case of two girls posing in their bras at twelve- and thirteen-years-old);
A.H., 949 So. 2d at 234 (discussing the Florida case of a sixteen-year-old girl who was
convicted for sharing sexuality explicit digital photos with her seventeen-year-old
boyfriend); Sherman, supra note 8, at 145 (discussing the case of a fourteen year-old
New Jersey girl who posted “racy pictures of herself on her MySpace page”).
246
See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 43 (“It is during
this period of total or only partial latency that are built up the mental forces which are
later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like damns, restrict its flow—
disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral ideals.”).
247
See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 138.
248
See generally The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 34–39 (discussing the formation
of the super-ego); THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 42
(“[T]he sexual life of children usually emerges in a form accessible to observation round
about the third or fourth year of life. It is during this period of total or only partial latency
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As a result, courts cannot justifiably punish teens in an attempt to
protect them from the harms of seduction. Because seduction only
occurs in latency, courts cannot legitimately be worried about
adolescents hurting themselves or other adolescents by exposing
each other to sexual objects prematurely because it is technically
not premature.
Instead, by designating teenage sexting as criminal behavior
equivalent to child pornography—and justifying this designation
by citing the harm to “society as a whole”249—judges are
effectually punishing children for lacking a super-ego. But since
the teenage defendants have left the latency period, the super-ego
is already in place. Judges and prosecutors, therefore, are simply
failing to recognize it. By punishing teenage sexting, prosecutors
and judges are effectively disagreeing with the norms reflected by
the emerging super-ego of teenager-sexters.
In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud posits the
existence of a cultural super-ego, “under whose influence cultural
development proceeds.”250
Although the demands of the
individual super-ego normally “coincide with the precepts of the
prevailing cultural super-ego,” it is possible for individual superegos to diverge.251 Today, it is possible that teenage sexters
possess an alternative set of moral constructs foreign to the older
generation sitting on the bench and in the legislature. By rejecting
prevailing teenage super-egos through the prosecution of sexting as
child pornography, it is possible that prosecutors and judges are
simply anxious about a new, emerging cultural super-ego that
reflects different values about sex. If this is the case, the court
might rightly be censured or extolled for enforcing the traditional
cultural super-ego.252

that are built up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual
instinct . . . .”).
249
New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982).
250
21 SIGMUND FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 57, 141 (James Strachey ed.
& trans. 1961).
251
Id. at 142.
252
Interestingly, the defendant in United States v. Mento made a similar argument,
contending that “the government’s true purpose in combating child pornography has
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Given the diffusion of Freud’s ideas, it is perhaps unsurprising
that judges unknowingly rely on Freud’s theory of sexuality in
sexting cases. But even if courts are to correct their unconscious
Freudianism and recognize the timing of Freud’s model of
psychosexual development, American courts are only thinking
about early Freud. The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
were written in 1905, and in the decades following, Freud
corrected or adjusted many of his initial theories.253
As a final critique, we might fairly ask whether it is reasonable
for the law to enforce super-ego formation at all, even for preadolescent children who might still be in a period of latency.
Freud’s project, after all, was never normative but was strictly
descriptive. If the court really is punishing sexting as child
pornography in an attempt to prolong latency and dictate super-ego
formation, a number of criticisms might be raised. Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right of parents “to be free
from state interference with family relations,”254 including choices
about the upbringing of children, may prevent obvious attempts by
the states to force its educational program on teenagers.255
Nevertheless, many states have now developed educational
programs as an alternative punishment for teenagers who produce
and disseminate sexually explicit images of themselves.256

impermissibly shifted from preventing tangible harm to real children, toward eradicating
certain ideas that it considers inherently evil.” 231 F.3d 912, 919 (4th Cir. 2000).
253
See, e.g., The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 31–34 (detailing an adjustment to the
Oedipus complex first introduced in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality).
254
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000).
255
See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 643 (M.D. Pa. 2009). In this case,
the court cites a number of authorities establishing the right of parents to be free from
state interference in family relations. Id. at 643–644; see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control
of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
by” the Supreme Court); Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116
(1996) (finding that “[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children
are among associational rights” basic to our society . . . .”). Finally the court held that
“[a]s early as 1923, the Supreme Court found that ‘the “liberty” protected by the Due
Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children”
and “to control the education of their own.”’” Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 644
(quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
256
See 2012 Sexting Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 26,
2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2012.aspx.
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Even if the state may permissibly be involved in super-ego
formation through educational programs about sexting, we might
fairly question whether the state should be involved. It may be
true that charging teenage sexters with violating child pornography
laws “ultimately cause[s] a lifetime of harm”257 that surpasses even
the harm of sexting.258 After publishing his Three Essays, Freud
regularly discussed the antagonism between civilization and
instinctual life, admitting that the mental dams learned during
latency might ultimately prove harmful.259 In “‘Civilized’ Sexual
Morality and Modern Nervous Illness,” Freud explained that, “we
shall find that the injurious influence of civilization reduces itself
in the main to the harmful suppression of the sexual life of
civilized peoples (or classes) through the ‘civilized’ sexual
morality prevalent in them.”260 Ultimately, Freud concluded that
“the damage done by civilized sexual morality” may be
permissible because “the cultural gain derived from such an
extensive restriction of sexuality probably more than balances
these sufferings, which, after all, only affect a minority in any
severe form.”261 Today, as the practice of sexting continues to
grow, it seems that the minority who suffer for not fitting into the
majority’s concept of civilized sexuality—namely, teenagers who
engage in sexting—may be larger than Freud ever suspected. And
the punishment they suffer may be unduly severe. If imposing
prison sentences on teenagers and requiring their registration as
sex offenders is the new form that this suffering takes, we should
ask whether punishing sexting as child pornography is still
counterbalanced by the cultural gain of “civilized sexual morality”
that Freud recognized.
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